We present an interval logic, called Future Interval Logic (FIL), for the speci cation and veri cation of concurrent systems. Interval logics allow reasoning to be carried out at the level of time intervals, rather than instants. However, unlike some other interval logics, the primitive objects in our semantic model for FIL are not intervals, but instants. An interval is formed by identifying its end-points, which are instants satisfying given properties. The logic has an intuitive graphical representation, resembling the back-of-the-envelope timing diagrams that designers often draw to reason about concurrent interacting systems. The logic is designed to be insensitive to nite stuttering (a property that facilitates re nement-based multi-level correctness proofs), and is exactly as expressive as the fragment of Propositional Temporal Logic with`until' but no`next'. As the main result of this paper, we show that FIL is elementarily decidable by reduction to the emptiness problem for B uchi Automata. For most other interval logics the decision problem is at best non-elementary and often undecidable. We consider an extension of FIL with past operators and show that this extension leads to non-elementariness. In a companion paper, we extend the logic to real-time and investigate the decision problem for that extension.
Introduction
Speci cation and veri cation of concurrent systems is di cult, in part because the many possible alternative interleavings of activities generate a large number of cases that must be considered. It can be argued that the propositional -calculus is too low-level to capture abstract system requirements easily without including extraneous details that can bias subsequent implementations. Propositional Temporal Logic (PTL), although more high-level, is often di cult to use, because of the presence of deeply nested until operators in formul . Interval logics aid the speci cation of concurrent systems by providing temporal modalities designed explicitly to ease the de nition of temporal contexts and of properties required to hold in such contexts. In particular, Future Interval Logic (FIL) has been developed with these objectives in mind.
Interval logics also permit natural graphical representations, which are usually more intuitive and easier to understand than their textual counterparts. When expressed graphically, interval logic formul resemble the \back-of-the-envelope" timing diagrams that designers typically draw to document and reason about temporal properties of their designs.
The following example, although somewhat contrived, illustrates these points. Let p, q and r represent observable signals of a system, S, whose temporal behaviour is restricted as follows:
1. p is initially false 2. for every maximal, bounded (i.e. nite), interval during which p is continuously true, if q becomes coterminally true in that interval, then everywhere in that interval q is true if and only if r is false. 1 A speci cation of this behaviour in PTL 10] (1) where U , U , and P represent, respectively, the weak until operator, the strong until operator, and the precedes operator de ned by f P g def :(:f U g).
It is not very easy to see that formula (1) does indeed represent the behaviour described above. This is mainly because the concept of a maximal p-interval is not easily expressed in a language, such as PTL, which does not have either a semantic notion of interval, or a natural syntactic construct that expresses such a notion. This problem is not mitigated by introducing past operators (such as since S) or even auxiliary predicates.
On the other hand, in the graphical representation of FIL the behaviour is naturally expressed as (2) In the formula above, we have used searches to locate points in the overall trace 3 representing a behaviour, and then we have restricted the semantics of the nested formula within a nite subtrace, which 1 A formula is coterminally true in an interval if there is a point in the interval beyond which it remains always true within the interval. 2 Throughout the paper we shall, when formul have deeply nested temporal operators, use a two-dimensional display format, with vertical juxtaposition of two formul without an intervening operator to denote conjunction.
we call an interval, demarcated by these points. The visual representation, using an explicit time line representing a trace, together with intervals, representing speci c temporal contexts, further enhances the intelligibility of the formula.
This formula is read from top to bottom and from left to right. The topmost interval, shown by the solid line with a square bracket on the left and a rounded parenthesis on the right, represents an in nite trace, with time progressing from left to right. The formula is a conjunction of two formul .
The rst conjunct :p is drawn ush with the left end of the entire context, thus representing a property that must hold at the initial state. The second conjunct is an invariant for the entire computation, and is drawn indented below the interval, indicating that it must hold when evaluated at any point in the context. The searches locate states in the trace at which the formul labelling the arrows hold. Intervals are formed by identifying their endpoints. In the formula above, the searches identify any maximal p-interval. A diamond drawn within an interval denotes the existence of a point within the interval at which a designated property holds. In the example above, it is used to assert the existence of a point (within the maximal p-interval identi ed above) such that q is always true over the su x of the outer interval beginning with that point.
For those familiar with the Duration Calculus (or its precursor, the Interval Temporal Logic of 14]), the above property would be stated (almost \isomorphically" to (2) Above, _ denotes the \chop" operator of the duration calculus.
It is not surprising that the expressions (2) and (3) are so similar, in view of the fact that they are both interval logics, with explicit interval manipulation operators, albeit of di erent kinds, both here expressing a property of intervals. The non-elementary complexity of the decision problem for ITL is well-known 14], while that for FIL is elementary, by the results of this paper. A more detailed comparison of FIL with ITL and other interval logics appears in Section 6.
It is easy to conclude from (2) that, indeed, the following property also holds; a conclusion obtained by simply noting that in the given context q and :r are equivalent. 
This illustrates another point regarding logics that allow the expression of intervals in their syntax. One can often give clearer temporal proofs in a logic that has the ability to restrict the temporal context of an inference. The above proof may, in the light of this remark, be interpreted as being performed in two steps. In the rst step we create a context. Then within this context we exploit local properties of the trace (i.e. those properties that hold only within this restricted temporal context) to infer other local properties in the second step. We might represent the above argumentation in a stylized natural deduction-like format (5) with 2If 1 and 2If 2 representing formul (2) and (4), respectively, and f 1 and f 2 representing, respectively, the nested formul 32q ) 2(q :r) and 32q ) 32 :r. The rst and last steps in this derivation follow by the well-known inference rules of temporal instantiation and temporal generalization, respectively. Arguments such as the one given above are not uncommon in correctness proofs of concurrent systems.
FIL further allows one to state properties such as contiguity of two distinct contexts, to create a larger context that is the ( nite) union of given contiguous contexts, and to conclude, for instance, that if a proposition is an invariant for each of the smaller contexts, it is also an invariant for the larger context. These interesting proof-theoretic aspects of the logic are a useful abstraction that should make temporal proofs more compositional; however, these aspects of the logic are not investigated in this paper.
Further details of the visual syntax used informally above appear in 8, 19] . Having made our point about the visual aspect of the logic, we shall revert to a textual representation both for the sake of compactness and for typographical ease. For instance, using the textual syntax, formulas (2) and (4) above are written, respectively, as :p^2 !:p; !p j !:p; !p; !:p) (32q ) 2(q :r)) (6) and 2 !:p; !p j !:p; !p; !:p) (32q ) 32:r)) (7) Although the correspondence between the textual formul and their graphical representation is easy to see above, a formal proof of this correspondence, and of the unambiguity of the graphical language, are non-trivial. These issues are beyond the scope of this paper, and the reader should consult 8] for these details.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we introduce Future Interval Logic (FIL), rst informally explaining its semantics, then formally introducing its syntax, intended models and semantics. Section 3 begins by motivating the mechanics of the decision procedure, leading up to the automata-theoretic construction, which constitutes the the main technical result of this paper. At the end of the section, we give upper and lower bounds for the decision problem, relegating proof details to an appendix. In Section 4 we brie y discuss some expressiveness issues; details of the proofs leading to the expressive equivalence of FIL with PTL(U) appear in 18]. Section 5 considers an extension of the`purely future' FIL with past operators, and shows that this extension leads to non-elementariness. We discuss related work in Section 6, and present conclusions in Section 7. An appendix contains proofs of some theorems from Sections 3.5 and 5.
The Logic
Since FIL is a linear-time logic, a formula is interpreted on a linear trace = h (i)i i2! of states (i), representing a possible execution of a process P, 2 P. 4 An FIL formula may be evaluated at any state (i) in the trace. The semantics of boolean connectives are de ned in the usual manner. The key construct of the logic is the interval modality. Syntactically, an interval modality is constructed (as we saw in the last section) by means of searches and other simpler formul . We will often represent such a formula by If, where I represents an interval modality, and f represents a formula. The modality I may, for instance, stand for !:p; !p j !:p; !p; !:p) of (6). When we need to explicitly refer to the search patterns inside a modality, we may use the metalogical notation 1 j 2 ) and, in this case, understand that 1 = !:p; !p and 2 = !:p; !p; !:p.
Informal Semantics
Semantically, an interval modality 1 j 2 ) identi es a subsequence of contiguous states, i.e. a subtrace, of the given trace. This is achieved by identifying its endpoints, the left endpoint located by means of the search pattern 1 , and the right endpoint by means of the search pattern 2 . This subtrace then speci es the structure over which the nested subformula, for instance f above, must hold. 5 The semantics of a search, for instance !p above, that starts at a given point in the trace is that it locates the earliest point in the re exive future where the target formula p holds. When such searches are composed sequentially, as in !p; !:p, every subsequent search begins at the state that the previous search located. In the case that the target of a search is not satis ed at any point in the future of the point where the search began, within the previous outer interval, the formula is assumed to be true by default. Thus, the semantics of If should be read as \if the subcontext I can be identi ed within the current context, then f must hold on the subcontext so identi ed."
More precisely, the modality 1 j 2 ) de nes a context, which is either the null context, represented ? M or the subsequence beginning with the state located by the searches speci ed in 1 and ending with that preceding the state located by the searches speci ed in 2 . A non-trivial search pattern speci es a sequence of searches. If the target of a search cannot be located in the current context or if the state located by 1 does not precede that located by 2 , then the formula 1 j 2 )f is assumed to be vacuously satis ed. This \default-to-true" semantics yields the following meaning for : 1 j 2 )f at a state: an interval of the form 1 j 2 ) exists in the (non-strict) future and f does not hold at the rst state in that interval. The trivial \searches" ? and ! have the following meaning: ? leaves us at the point where we were, and ! takes us o the end of the current context. They can be used in the following situations: the modality ? j 2 ) attempts to construct a pre x of the original context starting at the point of evaluation and extending up to, but not including, the point located by 2 ; the modality 1 j !) attempts to construct a su x, starting at the state located by 1 and extending up to, and including, the last state of the current context.
As an example, consider the FIL formula !:f 1 j !)false. Since false cannot hold for any context except the null context, the above formula can never be satis ed in a trace starting at a point such that :f holds somewhere in the re exive future. In other words, it is satis ed only when f is invariant over the entire future; this is equivalent to the PTL formula 2f 1 . Its dual : !f 1 j !)false asserts that there 4 We, thus, identify a process with the set of its behaviours. 5 However, for notational convenience, in the formal de nition we identify a nite trace with the in nite trace obtained by stuttering its last state.
is some state in the future where f 1 holds, and is equivalent to the PTL formula 3f 1 . We can express the weak until formula f 1 U f 2 by !(:f 1 _ f 2 ) j !)f 2 . The formula ? j !f 2 )f 1 asserts that in the interval that remains after chopping-o the earliest su x that satis es f 2 , the formula f 1 holds. Note, however, that this is not equivalent to the Process Logic formula f 1 C f 2 (read \f 1 chop f 2 "), which requires that there is some point in the trace such that f 1 holds over the pre x to that point and f 2 holds over its su x. This point is crucial, for a logic that can succinctly express the chop is doomed to non-elementariness | in fact, in Section 5 we shall exploit this ability of the extension of the logic with past operators to exhibit non-elementariness.
Having introduced FIL informally above, we now present its formal syntax and semantics. For technical convenience, we de ne a restricted syntax that does not include derived operators such as 2, 3 and U since these can be easily expressed in the restricted syntax.
Syntax
The syntax of FIL, represented by the set of well-formed formul (w ) of the logic, relative to a denumerable set P of primitive propositions, is de ned by the following grammar: f ::== true j p j :f j f 1^f2 j If I ::== ?j ) j j!) j 1 j 2 ) ::== !f j !f; where p 2 P. As is customary, we use false as an abbreviation for :true, and f _ g for :(:f^:g). We will often use the abbreviations 2f for !:fj!)false and 3f for :2:f. We shall also syntactically identify, throughout this paper, ::f with f within any context. Notation. We use suitably decorated f; g; to range over w , FIL(P), identi ed by the syntactic category f in the BNF above. We shall call a w purely propositional if it does not contain an interval modality. The names !a, !b, , suitably decorated, range over the search patterns, srch(P), the syntactic category identi ed by . For the sake of convenience, we shall allow srch(P) to include the trivial search patterns ? and !. Suitably decorated, I will range over imod(P), the syntactic category identi ed by I above.
Models
As stated before, the models for FIL are !-traces, where each element in the trace represents a state, assigning a valuation to the primitive propositions in the set P. We can regard each state as the collection of propositions that are true in that state. Thus, an FIL model is a mapping M: ! ! 2 P .
For technical convenience in de ning the formal semantics, we shall also require the notion of a special null model, denoted ? M , which trivially satis es any w .
Semantics
Our semantics make use of a \search" function for locating the result of a search and the \subcon-text" function C for constructing the subcontext, given the current context and the states located by the searches. Intuitively, given a search pattern , a model M and a point i, the search function produces the point j located by the sequence of searches in , started at point i in M. Given 6 3 Deciding FIL We use the well-known automata-theoretic approach for deciding the satis ability of an FIL formula.
The basic idea in this approach is to construct, for the given formula f, a suitable automaton whose accepting structures may then be placed in some form of correspondence with the satisfying models of f such that f is satis able i the automaton accepts some structure. The satis ability problem for the logic is thus reduced to the non-emptiness problem for this form of automata. In the case of FIL, B uchi sequential automata su ce, and the correspondence that we shall exhibit between structures accepted by the automaton and the satisfying models of f will be a bijection.
The automata-theoretic approach to solving such decision problems was introduced by B uchi 6] to give a decision method for S1S, the monadic second order theory of the naturals. It has been popularized in computer science, in particular, in the domain of temporal logics, by Vardi and Wolper 40] , and we refer the reader to 43] for an excellent introduction and overview.
However, to the best of our knowledge, FIL is the rst interval logic to which such a method has been successfully applied to obtain an e cient decision procedure. In part, the di culty of applying this method to interval logics stems from the need to succinctly encode the notion of bounded temporal scope into the runs of the automaton. In this section we describe in detail how we can do this for FIL.
An Overview of the Decision Strategy
As mentioned above, the main novelty of FIL, the notion of a bounded temporal context, also turns out to be a major source of di culty in extending the usual methods to deciding FIL. This is because in the case of temporal formul that are themselves nested within some restricted temporal context, the \scope" of the nested formula is not the entire context. This means that the formul annotating the \states" of the automaton that we construct for a formula must themselves encode this notion of temporal scope. These sets of FIL formul constitute the states (memory) of the automaton representing, intuitively, the conditions that the automaton is \verifying."
Consider, for instance, the formula f def !a j !b)3c which involves nested temporal modalities.
Here the scope of the subformula 3c above, for instance, is retricted by its outer context identi ed by !a j !b). 6 The empty conjunction is identi ed with true. (a) a never holds over the model (so the left search fails) (b) b never holds over the model (so the right search fails) (c) the rst state at which b holds precedes, or coincides with, the rst state at which a holds (so the induced context is empty).
These conditions can be checked by the B uchi automaton in Figure 1 .
2. On the other hand, the constructibility condition implies that a holds strictly before b. The appropriate automaton recognizing the constructibility of the context is shown in Figure 2 (a).
However, we must also check that within this context 3c also holds. This is equivalent to verifying, when our automaton rst encounters the a marking the start of the context that the formul 3b
and ?j!b)3c hold for the remaining su x of the computation. But this is easily done as follows.
Our automaton commences to look for an occurrence of a b and a c. If a b is encountered before or coincident with a c, it rejects (the end of the context is reached without nding the c that is required to occur within the context). If a c is encountered before a b, then we are done, having only to verify that we also do nd the b marking the right end of the context. Thus, the correct automaton for this combination of conditions is the one shown in Figure 2 (b).
Thus, an automaton for f will be one that is the union of the automata in Figures 1 and 2 (b).
The above description should give the reader some intuition about the working of the decision procedure. We should note here that all of the intermediate \veri cation conditions" that the automaton generates in any run are encodable in FIL | our automaton remembers these conditions by writing the corresponding FIL formul in its memory | and, as we will see in the next few sections, these FIL formul are also syntactically \simpler" than the original formula that generated them. As we shall see later, these are precisely the set of formul in the original formula's subformula closure, to be de ned shortly.
We now proceed to formalize a decision procedure for the logic based on the intuitions given above.
Preliminaries
As is usual for automata-theoretic decision procedures, we de ne the subformula closure for a given FIL formula. The subformula closure scl(f) captures the idea that in deciding the satis ability of a formula f, one need only consider formul in the set scl(f). These formul intuitively represent all the \veri cation conditions" that the automaton need ever consider while verifying f. As in 11], our closure is actually an extended subformula closure, sometimes also called the Fischer-Ladner Closure, in the sense that formul that are not just the \pure syntactic subformul " of f may be present in scl(f). \boolean subformul " in rules 1 through 4, where an outermost boolean connective is removed, or added, to obtain the subformul \search subformul " in rule 5, where the target of the rst search, in a search pattern of an interval modality constitutes the subformula \subcontext subformul " in rules 6, 7, 9, where an outermost interval modality is \simpli ed", and in rule 10, where the subformul are formed within a given context \failure subformul " in rule 8, where the subformul assert a property of the (non-)constructibility of an outermost context Example 3.2 Consider the formula !p j !p; !q)3r, where p; q; r 2 P. In our restricted syntax the formula is equivalent to f def !p j !p; !q): !r j !)false. The formula and its subformula closure set is shown in Figure 3 , in the form of a Hasse diagram, with ordering relation \is a subformula of." In each \node" of the diagram, we assume that a formula and its negation are both present, although for clarity we do not explicitly show the negation. In the gure, if node N 1 is reachable from node N 2 , then every formula in N 1 (and its negation) is in the subformula closure of every formula in N 1 N 2 and their negations. We use f 1 ; ; f 16 to abbreviate formul in scl(f) as shown in the gure.
The above example suggests that the containment relation on subformula closures of formul induces a pre-order on formul . Let I represent a sequence of interval modalities, some possibly negated, of the form ? j ). Observe that f 1 f 2 i scl(f 1 ) = scl(f 2 ). In fact, Lemma 3.4 Let f 1 , f 2 be formul such that f 1 6 f 2 and f 2 2 scl(f 1 ). Then, scl(f 2 ) scl(f 1 ). As a result of the above, the quotient set scl(f)= is a strict partial order under the inclusion of subformula closure sets. In Example 3, for instance, the formul (and their negations, which are not shown) that occur clustered at a node of the Hasse diagram are subformula equivalent.
To characterize the complexity of our decision procedure we shall need the notion of the size and depth of a well-formed string in our language. The size of a formula is the number of primitive propositions and logical connectives in the formula (for technical reasons, we shall allow the \trivial searches" ! and ? to contribute 1 to the size), and its depth is the maximum depth of nesting of interval modalities in the formula plus one. 8 Example 3. Notation. For a nite set S of formul , we let size(S) = f2S size(f).
The following is easily proved by induction on the structure of an FIL formula, and a case analysis of the subformula closure rules. Lemma 3.6 For a formula f of size n and depth k, card (scl(f)) = O(n k ). The following section on reductions partially justi es the construction of scl(f) in the manner speci ed above.
Assume that at a given point i of a model M the formul f and p (of Example 3.2) both hold. Clearly, the searches to p in f both locate the state M(i), so that f 4 must also hold at i in M. Moreover, f 5 must not hold at i, unless either q holds at i (i.e. the interval \collapses" to a null context) or f 16 holds at i (i.e. the search for q \fails"). This motivates the following series of de nitions culminating with Lemma 3.12.
Reductions on Interval Formul
We de ne a parameterized irre exive partial order relation between formul involving interval modalities which we call a reduction relation. Essentially, a formula f 1 is a reduction of another formula f 2 with respect to a formula a if f 1 is a (proper) subformula of f 2 and, whenever a is satis ed at a state in a model, it is the case that f 1 holds at that state i f 2 does. The concept of reductions is useful for succinctly de ning the states and transitions for the automata that we require for our decision procedure, and is formalized by means of the following de nitions.
De nition 3.7 Reductor Set] The reductor set red(f) of a formula f is the smallest set of w , not containing f, such that if f is of the form !a; 1 j 2 )f 1 ; !a j 2 )f 1 , 1 j !a; 2 )f 1 or 1 j !a)f 1 The reductor set for a formula contains precisely those subformul which may serve as parameters for a \reduction operation" (to be de ned shortly) on that formula. Both this and the following de nition may be understood by factoring along the lines of De nition 3.1.
De nition 3.8 Let a and f be formul . Then f is a-reducible i a 2 red(f). If S is a set of formul , then f is S-reducible i it is a-reducible for some a 2 S. Notation. Let S be a set of formul and let f be a formula. Then f 0 S f i there exists a formula a 2 S such that f 0 a f. We denote the re exive transitive closure of the relation S by S . Observe also that, if a formula f is a-reducible to f 0 , for some a, then a; f 0 2 scl(f); in fact, scl(a) and scl(f 0 ) are proper subsets of scl(f). Example 3.10 For the formula f of Example 3.2, Figure 4 illustrates the de nitions just given. In the gure, we represent f 2 a f 1 by an edge from f 1 (above) to f 2 (below) labelled with a. Multiple labels on an edge indicate a choice of applicable reductors a, both leading to the same f 2 . For a formula, the set of labels on all outgoing edges is precisely the reductor set for that formula.
Reductions are essentially a device for \simplifying" the veri cation conditions arising during the satis ability procedure. (Recall that when f 0 a f, both f 0 and a are \simpler" than f.) The following fact formalizes this intuition. Lemma 3.11 Let f; f 0 ; a be formul , and let M be a model such that hM; ii j = a and f 0 a f. Then hM; ii j = f i hM; ii j = f 0 .
Proof. The proof is by a case analysis of the reduction rule used in the reduction (De nition 3.9). The presence of the last two rules requires an induction. We induct on the level of the`reduction inference', i.e. on the number of applications of reduction rules. The base case involves an application of one of the rst ve rules, which can be proved easily using the semantics of FIL.
For the induction step, we have two cases depending upon whether rule (6) or (7) was used as the last inference. The case of rule (6) is immediate, so we consider here the case of rule (7).
Let f be ? j 2 )f 1 , a be ? j 2 )b and f 0 be ? j 2 )f 0 1 . To establish the forward implication, assume that hM; ii j = f, hM; ii j = a and f 0 a f. Using the semantics of the logic, it is clear that hM 0 ; 0i j = f 1 , and hM 0 ; 0i j = b, where M 0 = M i; ( 2 ;hM;ii)) . But, by the de nition of reduction, f 0 1 b f 1 , so that by the induction hypothesis hM 0 ; 0i j = f 0 1 . Again, from the semantics, we have hM; ii j = ? j 2 )f 0 1 as required. The backwards implication follows similarly.
In fact, the above lemma implies that if hM; ti j = a for all a 2 S and if f 0 S f then hM; ti j = f i hM; ti j = f 0 .
Notation. In what follows, I represents a sequence of zero or more interval modalities of the form ? j ), which we refer to as current modalities.
The following fact is related to the last, and motivates the construction of the local automaton transition relation in Section 3.3.1. It also serves to simplify the proof of soundness for the procedure appearing in Section 3.4.2.
Lemma 3.12 Let M be a model and let f be a formula such that, for all a 2 red(f), hM; ii 6 j = a. Then For the induction step, let f = ?j )I n 1 j 2 )f 1 , where I n has nesting depth n. As before, we can conclude that ( ; hM; ii) = ( ; hM; i + 1i) i + 1. Now, let C( ?j ); hM; ii) = M 0 and C( ?j ); hM; i + 1i) = M 00 . Clearly M 00 is either ?jM or the \ rst su x" of M 0 . Recall that b 2 red(I n 1 j 2 )f 1 ) i ?j )b 2 red(f). Moreover, for any b, by the semantics, hM; ii j = ?j )b i hM 0 ; 0i j = b, and hM; i + 1i j = ?j )b i hM 00 ; 0i j = b. Now, using the induction hypothesis on M 0 and the formula I n 1 j 2 )f 1 , the result follows.
Clause 2. As in the rst part, we induct on the depth of nesting in I. Only the base case di ers, the induction step being essentially similar to the previous case (except that it uses an appropriately stronger induction hypothesis). For the base case, as in the previous part, we obtain the same subcontext model, call it M 0 . Now consider the case where M 0 = ? M . In this case, hM; ii 6 j = f and hM; i+1i 6 j = f. When M 0 6 = ? M , we have hM; i + 1i 6 j = false and, moreover, hM; ii j = f i hM; i + 1i j = f. The result follows.
De nition 3.13 (Basis) Let f; f 0 be formul and S a set of formul such that f 0 S f and f 0 is S-irreducible. Then f 0 is a basis formula for f with respect to S.
Note that the basis formula for any formula with respect to a given set is unique. The proof relies on a certain form of local con uence for S and the absence of in nite descending chains. This ensures global con uence by (a slight variant of) Newman's Diamond Lemma 25] . It is useful to bear this in mind (and we shall implicitly assume this in our subsequent exposition) although we do not require this property for any of our subsequent proofs.
Notation. We shall denote the basis for f with respect to S by h hfi i S .
Extensions and Hintikka Sets
We have so far represented models as mappings from ! to the powerset of primitive propositions. It is a useful abstraction for the description of the decision procedure and for the subsequent correctness proofs to extend this mapping, so that it provides valuations to every formula in scl(f It is easy to see that for an arbitrary model, extension is well-de ned and, thus, that corresponding to every model there is a unique extension with respect to a given formula. Moreover, every state in an extended model is consistent in the sense that for any formula f 0 2 scl(f), if f 0 is in the state then :f 0 is not complete (up to elements in scl(f)) in the sense that for any formula f 0 2 scl(f) either f 0 or :f 0 is in the state. Most constructive decision procedures use special kinds of sets of formul to construct the \com-ponents" of a canonical model for a given formula. The formul in such a set, like the states in the extended models above, give a complete characterization of that component of the model in terms of not only the atomic formul (primitive propositions), but also more complicated formul . Following tradition 10, 37], we call such a set of formul a Hintikka set for an FIL formula. 9 De nition 3.15 Hintikka Set] A Hintikka set for a formula f is a subset s of scl(f) satisfying the following conditions:
As a result of the rst rule, Hintikka sets are complete and consistent in the sense stated above. However, they may contain temporal inconsistencies that may make them unsatis able. The completeness proof for our decision procedure uses the fact that if a set is not Hintikka then it is unsatis able. Thus, it su ces to consider Hintikka sets in the automaton construction, as we shall see shortly.
Lemma 3.16 Any complete subset of scl(f) that is not Hintikka is not satis able. Proof. Assume that s is a complete subset of scl(f) that is not Hintikka. We use a case analysis on the condition in De nition 3.15 which s violates. Consider for instance the last condition. Assume that f 1 a f 2 , a 2 s, f 1 2 s and f 2 6 2 s. Since s is complete, :f 2 2 s. Let M be a satisfying model for s. Then hM; 0i j = f 1 and hM; 0i j = a, so that by Lemma 3.11, hM; 0i j = f 2 . But :f 2 2 s and, thus, hM; 0i j = :f 2 , a contradiction. The case of f 1 6 2 s and f 2 2 s is similar.
Arguments for the remaining cases can be made in a similar manner using the semantics of the logic to exhibit a contradiction. As stated before, however, the converse of the above lemma is not true. Consider, for instance, a Hintikka set s for f def !p j !)q^ !p j !):q, given by s = ff; !p j !)q; !p j !):q; : !p j !)false; :p; :q; trueg This set is unsatis able because there is an obvious temporal con ict above. Temporal con icts such as the above are detected by the automata that we construct in the sequel by a process of \unwrapping" interval modalities.
It follows easily from Lemma 3.16 that for any formula f and a model M, each state M f (i) of the extended model M f is Hintikka.
Note, however, that not every !-sequence of satis able Hintikka sets is the extension of a model, because the consecution of states in the sequence might be unsatis able. Consider, for instance, the two satis able Hintikka sets s = f: !p j !)false; :p; trueg t = f !p j !)false; :p; trueg and any !-sequence of Hintikka sets, for !p j !)false, such that for some i we have (i) = s and (i + 1) = t. It is not di cult to see that cannot be the extension of any model, since (i) requires that in the future of i, there must be a p-state and (i + 1) requires that there be no p-state in its (re exive) future. This type of temporal sequencing con ict between two satis able Hintikka sets is handled by suitably de ning transition and acceptance conditions for the automata that we construct in the sequel.
Notation. For a formula f, let H(f) represent the set consisting of all the Hintikka sets for f.
B uchi Automata
B uchi Automata are nite automata on in nite strings and have a special in nite acceptance criterion. They were invented by B uchi 6] to give a constructive decision procedure for S1S, the monadic secondorder theory of one successor function. In a celebrated paper 27], Rabin generalized them to operate over in nite labelled binary trees, and equipped them with a more general acceptance criterion to obtain a decision procedure for S2S, the monadic second-order theory of two successor functions.
The use of B uchi automata in veri cation and for obtaining decision procedures for modal logics was rst advocated by Vardi and Wolper. A nice overview, at an elementary level, of the automatatheoretic method for temporal logics can be found in 43]. Choueka 7] gives a compendium of results on the language-theoretic and closure properties of various types of !-automata. The various automata di er essentially in their acceptance criteria and may, thus, have di erent expressive power and closure properties 39].
The following de nition of a (non-deterministic) B uchi Automaton is the standard one recast in our notation and terminology.
De nition 3.17 B uchi Automaton] A B uchi Automaton is a tuple h ; S; ; S I ; S F i where is a nite input alphabet S is a nite set of states : S ! 2 S de nes a transition function specifying for each state and input symbol the set of possible next states S I S is the set of initial states S F S is the set of accepting states. A run of the automaton on an !-string 2 ! is an !-string s 2 S ! such that s(0) 2 S I and for all i 2 !; s(i + 1) 2 (s(i); (i)). The run is accepting i the set fi 2 ! j s(i) 2 S F g is in nite. An automaton in state s 2 S consumes an input symbol t 2 i (s; t) 6 = ;. We shall say that an automaton consumes a string if it has a run (not necessarily accepting) on that string.
When an automaton is deterministic, we shall often emphasize this by writing the transition function as : S ! S.
The Algorithm
We are now ready to de ne the construction of the automaton A m (f) corresponding to a formula f, such that the accepting runs of A m (f) correspond precisely to the accepting models of f. Together with the decidability of the emptiness problem for B uchi automata, this gives us a decision procedure for FIL.
In 5] Alpern and Schneider give a characterization of safety and liveness properties (de ned topologically in 4]) by means of the structural properties of the automata recognizing them. They also show that any property that is recognizable by a (non-deterministic) B uchi automaton can be expressed as the intersection of a safety property and a liveness property expressible as B uchi automata. Call a B uchi automaton reduced i every state is reachable, and from every state it is possible to reach some accepting state. The authors show that the regular !-languages in the safety class correspond to the class of languages recognized by non-deterministic reduced automata in which every state is accepting. Similarly, those in the liveness class correspond to the class of languages recognized by reduced B uchi automata which have an in nite run (not necessarily accepting) on every !-string. This is precisely the dichotomy that we shall make, in constructing A m (f). Following 43], we shall de ne a local automaton A l (f) which recognizes the safety component of f and an eventuality automaton A e (f) which recognizes the liveness component. A m (f) is their product, recognizing the intersection, which is precisely the property de ned by f.
More intuitively, A l (f) ensures that local consistency conditions are not violated | that no \bad thing" ever happens. These essentially guarantee that, starting in a \legal" initial state, the automaton can only enter states that are consistent with its previous state. The eventuality automaton A e (f) ensures that liveness requirements are met | that all \good things" eventually happen. Where it is clear from context, we shall often omit the parameterization of the automata.
The reader can verify these properties for the automata that we de ne subsequently. In particular, observe the correspondence between the traces accepted by A l and A e , respectively, with the de nitions of safety and liveness properties in 4], and that of the structural properties of the automata we construct, both for FIL in this paper as well as for its real-time extension in the companion paper 31], with the characterization of 5].
Local Automaton
The local automaton checks the consistency of local transition conditions. We represent the local automaton by A l (f) = h2 scl(f) ; H(f); l ; N(f); H(f)i; Observe that A l is non-deterministic and, in a sense, \drives" the model-generation procedure by making choices, wherever they are available, without violating local consistency conditions. However, because of its rst transition condition, in any state, A l accepts a unique symbol corresponding to that state. In particular, no symbol that is not a Hintikka set is ever consumed by A l .
Observe also that for all s 2 H(f); s 2 l (s; s); i.e. each state of A l has a self-loop. This, coupled with the fact that each state of A l is accepting, ensures that the string obtained by pumping any number of copies, including in nitely many, of a symbol in an accepting string into the string is also accepted by A l | in other words, its language is closed under nite and in nite stuttering. In order, to prevent unfair runs, we need the eventuality automaton to rule out certain in nitely stuttering models that are accepted by A l .
Eventuality Automaton
The eventuality automaton is required for checking whether eventuality requirements are ful lled in in nite runs. This is a deterministic B uchi automaton, represented by A e (f) = h2 scl(f) ; 2 E(f) ; e ; f;g; f;gi where E(f) is the subset of scl(f) that contains all formul of the form : j !)false e :2 E(f) 2 scl(f) ! 2 E(f) is the deterministic transition function such that e (s; i) is the set ? if s = ; then ff 1 j f 1 2 E(f) \ i and f 1 is i-irreducible g ? if s 6 = ; then fh hf 1 i i i j f 1 2 s and h hf 1 i i i 2 E(f) g Observe that A e is fully deterministic, and complete. Thus, in any state s 2 2 E(f) , there is a unique next state speci ed for any i 2 H(f). Moreover, if e (s; i) = t; s 6 = ; and t 6 = s, then size(t) < size(s). This follows from the second transition rule of A e and the de nition of reduction.
Finally, observe that for every state s of A e and every letter i in its alphabet, if e (s; i) = t then either s = t or e (t; i) = t. In the terminology of fundamental-mode asynchronous automata, A e does not cycle.
It is important to note that A e (f) \veri es" only unbounded eventualities, i.e. pure liveness properties. Bounded liveness properties, which require an eventuality within a bounded context, are handled by A l in conjunction with A e , as follows: A l checks (recall its last transition condition) that the enclosing context does not end before the eventuality is found, a pure safety property; A e checks that the (right) end of the enclosing context does eventually occur, a pure liveness property. It is for this reason, that we do not require A e to remember formul of the form I: j!)false, where I has at least one current interval modality.
The following property of runs of A l and A e turns out to be useful for our proof of completeness. Lemma 3.18 Let l and e represent, respectively, the runs of A l and A e on some !-string . Then for all i 2 !, e (i) l (i). Proof. We rst make the following observation about the statement of our lemma. It is easy to see that on any arbitrary !-string on which A l has a run, it has a unique run. Moreover, A e has a unique run on an arbitrary input, therefore, on an input on which A l has a run. The proof of the lemma follows by induction on the index i of the run, as follows:
Base Case. Every Hintikka set has some element; so l (0) 6 = ;. But e (0) = ;.
Inductive
Step. Assume now that e (n) l (n). We consider two cases.
Case 1 e (n) = ;]. First note that a Hintikka set contains its basis, since it is closed under reductions, and every Hintikka set contains true 6 2 E(f). From the transition conditions of A e , therefore, e (n + 1) is a subset of the nth input which is l (n). Further, by the transition conditions of A l , l (n+1) contains all irreducible formul in l (n), so that e (n + 1) l (n + 1).
Case 2 e (n) 6 = ;]. Since e (n + 1) contains the irreducible subset of e (n) and l (n + 1) contains all irreducible formul of l (n), using the induction hypothesis, we have e (n + 1) l (n + 1). Proof. Since scl(f) is nite, so are the number of states, and formul in each state, of A l and A e . Thus the construction of A m (f) is e ective. By Lemmas 3.20 and 3.23, which we prove in the next section, it follows that the language of A m (f) is non-empty i f is satis able. Decidability follows from the fact that we can determine whether the language of a B uchi automaton is non-empty 39]. For the base case, since hM; 0i j = f, we have f 2 M f (0), so by construction M f (0) is an initial state of A l .
Model-Checking Automaton

Correctness of the Algorithm
For the induction step, we need only show that M f (n+1) 2 l (M f (n); M f (n)). Assume not. Then the transition M f (n)!M f (n + 1) violates one of the last two transition requirements for l . But using the de nition of extension, this contradicts Lemma 3.12.
Lemma 3.22 A e accepts M f . Proof. Because A e is deterministic and complete, as we observed before, there is a unique in nite run of A e that consumes M f , call it e . Since e (0) = ;, if e is not accepting, then there is a largest i such that e (i) = ;. Recall that for any two states s 6 = t, satisfying e (s; i) = t, size(t) < size(s). By the niteness of E(f), therefore, there exists k > i, such that for all j k, (j) = (k) 6 = ;. Thus, there is some formula : j !)false 2 (j) for all j k. Without loss of generality, let be !a; 0 .
By the de nitions of e and reducibility, a 6 2 M f (j) for all j k. Completeness of M f (j) implies that :a 2 M f (j) for all j k, whence the de nition of an extension, and the semantics, yield hM; ki j = !a; 0 j !)false. Proof. We show that given a string in the language of A m , we can construct a satisfying model for f. Let be the local automaton component of the !-sequence accepted by A m and let 0 be the sequence satisfying for all j 2 !, 0 (j) = fp 2 P j p 2 (j) g. We claim that h 0 ; 0i j = f. We prove the following stronger result rst. The result then follows by noting that f 2 scl(f) is in (0). Lemma 3.24 For any i 2 ! and f 1 2 scl(f); f 1 2 (i) i h 0 ; ii j = f 1 . Proof. The proof is for an arbitrary i by induction on the structure of formul which, as we argued before, corresponds to the inclusion order induced by scl on formul . The base case of primitive propositions follows immediately by construction.
For the induction step, consider the sample case of the formula I 1 j 2 )f 1 , call it f 0 . Assume, for the forward direction, that f 0 2 (i). We have two cases, depending upon whether or not the formula is (i)-reducible.
For the case where f 0 is (i)-reducible, let f 00 a f 0 , with a 2 (i). By our construction of Hintikka sets, therefore, f 00 2 (i), and from the induction hypothesis applied to a and f 00 together with Lemma 3.11, we have h 0 ; ii j = f 0 . If f 0 is (i)-irreducible, by construction of Hintikka sets, we have a 6 2 (i) for all a 2 red(f 0 ). By the transition conditions of A l , we have f 0 2 (i + 1). We now let j > i be the least point in the run at which a reduction occurs. Thus for all intermediate points k, i k < j, for all a 2 red(f 0 ), we have a 6 2 (k), so that by the induction hypothesis, h 0 ; ki 6 j = a. At j, we apply the argument of the previous case to obtain h ; ji j = f 0 . Now, through j ? i ? 1 applications of Lemma 3.12 (clause 1), we obtain h 0 ; ii j = f 0 . Thus, we are only required to show the existence of a nite j at which the rst reduction occurs. Assume not. Without loss of generality, let the rst modality in I above be of the form ?j!a; ). (The case where I is empty is very similar.) Then f 00 = : !a; j!)false 2 (i), since !a; j!)false 2 red(f 0 ) and f 0 is (i)-irreducible. Also a 2 red(f 0 ) as well as a 2 red(f 00 ). Since f 0 is never reduced after i, neither is f 00 , and by the transition conditions of A l , f 00 2 (k) for all k i. Since is accepted by A e , there is a least point k i, such that e (k) = ;, where e is the accepting run of A e on . By the transition conditions of A e , f 00 2 (k + 1). Now, since f 00 is never reduced in the future, f 00 2 e (l) for all l k + 1, thus contradicting the acceptance of by A e .
The backwards direction is similar, and involves the use of clause 2 of Lemma 3.12. The remaining cases are now routine along the same lines, and are omitted.
Complexity of the Decision Problem
Let f be an FIL formula of size n and depth k. By Lemma 3.6, card (scl(f)) = O(n k ). Therefore, the number of states in each of A l and A e is at most 2 O(n k ) and, therefore, so is the number of states in their product A m . Thus, the construction of the state transition tables for the automata may be done in 2 O(n k ) time, since the construction of a transition table requires checking each state against every other, and each state has O(n k ) formul , each of size at most n. Since checking for emptiness of the language of a B uchi automaton is linear in the number of states of the automaton, the complexity of the decision procedure is 2 O(n k ) . We show in the appendix, after a method of Sistla and Clarke 36] , that the problem is in fact in SPACE(O(n k )), and that for formul with bounded depth, no procedure can do better in the worst case, since the problem is PSPACE-hard. Theorem 3.25 Bounded depth satis ability for FIL is PSPACE-complete.
However, if we consider the general decision problem for FIL (i.e. no bound on depth), then our proof of PSPACE-containment fails. But it is trivial to modify the proof to obtain an EXPSPACE upper bound. We conjecture that the resulting (exponential) gap may be closed by tightening the lower bound, but have not so far been successful in proving EXPSPACE-hardness. 10 
Expressiveness
We brie y discuss the expressive power of FIL in this section. A major di culty in proving expressiveness results for FIL stems from the presence of the interval modality, which restricts the temporal scope of formul nested within it. One must, therefore, be careful when comparing the expressive power of FIL with some of the more traditional temporal logics that do not have temporal context restricting modalities. Throughout our discussion in this section, and subsequently, all our comparisons with existing logics are with versions that lack a next operator. (Recall that FIL is insensitive to nite stuttering.) We use PTL(U) for Propositional Temporal Logic with`until' (but no`next'). To refer to other versions of PTL, we use appropriate parameterizations: for instance, PTL(S; U) represents the version that also contains the past operator since S . Similarly, PTL (2) is the restricted version that has only the henceforth operator 2. 10 See also a related discussion in part II 31, Section 3.4].
Propositional Temporal Logic with Since and Until Lemma FIL is at least as expressive as PTL(U).
Proof. The following (semantics preserving) translation procedure appears in 18] (see also 8, 19] ).
We rst convert all strong until operators into weak until operators using the following congruence:
We then convert all U and 3 operators using the following two congruences:
Note that the fragment of FIL into which all of PTL(U) can thus be translated has a particularly simple form. It is easy to verify that the syntax for this fragment is given by the following BNF grammar:
f ::== p j true j :f j f 1^f2 j !f 1 j !)f 2
As one might expect, the decision procedure for FIL, when restricted to formul in this syntax, runs in PSPACE and DTIME(2 O(n) ) (independent of the depth of nesting of modalities). Unfortunately, this strategy does not work when PTL(U) is extended with past operators. However, it is known that PTL with the since operator is no more expressive than the pure future fragment of 
Lamport's Propositional Temporal Logic of Actions
The propositional fragment of Lamport's Temporal Logic of Actions (PTLA) is an extension of PTL (2) with actions. An action represents a condition on a (non-stuttering) transition between two states. Basically, an action formula allows one to relate the values of a predicate before and after a transition. For this purpose, primed predicates represent the values of predicates immediately following the transition. For instance, the PTLA formula a^b 0 ] says that following the next non-stuttering transition, if any, b holds, and immediately prior to that transition a holds. The logic also allows one to relativize actions, by specifying some subset of the set of primitive propositions whose change is \observable." For instance, a^b 0 ] fcg observes only those transitions which modify the value of proposition c. The formula thus states that following the next transition, if any, that modi es the value of c, it is the case that b holds, and immediately prior to that transition a holds. We refer the interested reader to 2, 20] for further details of the logic.
The ability to succinctly express relativized actions, in this manner, makes the logic very compact and easy to use. However, it is not very di cult to see that Theorem 4.4 FIL is at least as expressive as PTLA. Proof. Once again we give a semantics preserving translation, this time from PTLA into FIL. We need only deal with action formul a] S , S P, and primed propositions a 0 occurring inside action brackets as in a 0 ], for we have already seen how to deal with 2.
To carry out the translation, we rst rewrite any PTLA formula so that an action bracket is applied only to a primitive proposition, its primed version, or their negations. This is easily done, by rst rewriting the formula inside the brackets by using DeMorgan's rule to push negations all the way in, and then repeatedly applying the following rules:
The reason we do the above is that we want to deal with primed and unprimed propositions separately, since there is no direct mechanism in FIL to refer to a (relativised) transition. Having done this, we now deal with relativised action brackets as follows:
In the above, a is a primitive proposition or its negation 11 and, for X 2 2 S , f X represents the formulâ The translation given above is clearly too expensive to be the basis of a practical decision procedure for PTLA. Elsewhere 30] we give an alternative procedure to solve the decision problem for (an extension of) PTLA, where it is also shown that the problem is PSPACE-complete. To the best of our knowledge, it is not known whether PTLA can express U . However, we believe that it is quite unlikely that it can. Thus, we put forward Conjecture 4.5 FIL is strictly more expressive than PTLA.
On an Extension with Past Operators
Thus far, we have dealt with a pure future interval logic; all temporal references in the logic are only to the (re exive) future. A natural question to ask, then, is whether some form of reference to the past can be allowed in the logic, and how this might a ect the complexity of the decision problem. In this section, we consider an extension of FIL in which we allow searches to the past, while constructing intervals. We show that this simple extension renders the logic non-elementary.
It has been argued that the ability to refer to the past makes a temporal logic more compositional, as well as enhancing the intuitive clarity of speci cations and proofs. In the light of this evidence, 11 We have made use of the obvious PTLA identity :a 0 ] (:a) 0 ]. it might appear that FIL is not an attractive logic. We o er two reasons why this need not be such a drawback in our case. Firstly, because of context restricting modalities, FIL allows one to state precedence requirements quite naturally. For instance, the property prohibiting unsolicited response, expressed in PTL with past operators, as 2(p ) ♦q), stating that an occurrence of p must be preceded by an occurrence of q, may be expressed in FIL as ?j!p)3q, stating that the rst occurrence of a p is preceded by a q. Note that this is what the PTL formula is actually stating, since the condition of matching a p to the most recent q is more di cult. The closest equivalent is expressed in FIL as ? j !p)3q^2 !p; !:pj!p; !:p; !p)3q which states that, once p becomes false, it may not become true without the occurrence of a q.
Secondly, there is another way of introducing the past into the logic, without paying the complexity penalty. This is a spin-o of what we have termed \amalgamation" in 29]. Given a (propositional) logic, whose language is X relative to some given set of primitive propositions, the amalgamation of FIL with X, represented by FIL(X), has the syntax f ::= true x j :f j f 1^f2 j If I ::= ?j ) j j!) j 1 j 2 )
::= !f j !f; where x 2 X.
In other words, we are allowing FIL to use an underlying base logic as the assertion language, while itself providing a higher-level interval construction capability. Within this paradigm, we see interval construction as an independent and orthogonal constructor that can be used to extend the logic of your choice. For instance, X could be PTL(S; U). In FIL(PTL(S; U)), one keeps the compositional power of PTL(S; U), as well as obtaining the ability to reason with intervals. It turns out that the FIL(PTL(S; U)) is decidable with no complexity penalty vis-a-vis FIL. This and similar extensions are considered in 29], to which we refer the interested reader for the details.
With this small digression, we proceed now to the main topic of this section. We rst de ne the syntactic extension to FIL that gives us Generalized Interval Logic (GIL), 12 and then the semantics for the new constructs. Since there is no change in the semantics for the constructs of FIL, GIL is clearly a conservative extension of FIL.
Syntax
The syntax of GIL is the extension of FIL in which the interval modalities are extended with past searches:
I ::== ?j ) j j!) j 1 j 2 ) j j )
::== !f j !f; j f j f; 12 In previous work, we have often used the acronym GIL for Graphical Interval Logic, the graphical form of FIL, examples of which were seen at the beginning of the paper. However, since in this paper we make scant reference to Graphical Interval Logic, we shall use the acronym GIL for Generalized Interval Logic, without any confusion or ambiguity.
Semantics
The semantics for GIL are de ned by simply extending the de nition of the search function used in the FIL semantics of De nition 2.2, to account for the backwards searches. We list here only the new cases (when M 6 = ? M and i 6 = ?).
( ; hM; ii) = 0 ( a; hM; ii) = ( ?; if hM; ji 6 j = a for all j i max fj j j i; hM; ji j = a g; otherwise ( a; ; hM; ii) = ( ; hM; ( a; hM;ii)i) Observe that GIL is not invariant under stuttering | in particular, the formula j?)false is true at only the initial point of any model. It is possible to give a stuttering-invariant semantics for GIL, but this semantics appears to be unnatural; however, the computational complexity of the logic remains unchanged.
The rest of this section will be devoted to showing that the logic GIL de ned above is decidable, but non-elementarily so. We give here only a sketch of the proof, especially for decidability, most of which is routine but tedious. For the details, we refer the reader to the appendix.
Decidability
We use the method of interpretations to show that GIL is decidable. Let L GIL be the language of GIL and let L S2S be the language of S2S, the monadic second-order theory of two successor functions. Speci cally, we de ne a mapping F: L GIL ! L S2S , such that a GIL formula f is GIL-satis able i F(f) is S2S-satis able.
We should mention at this point that the choice of S2S rather than S1S as the language for the reduction has been made only for technical convenience. While it is not too di cult to give a reduction into S1S, the proof of correctness becomes substantially more di cult and less intuitive. Furthermore, S2S appears to handle the ! primitive much more elegantly than S1S. Finally, there is essentially little lost in the complexity of the resulting decision procedure by using S2S instead of S1S since the upper bounds on the complementation problems for automata on in nite trees 16, 17] and automata on in nite sequences 33] are both essentially exponential, in the sense of Klarlund 17 ] (2 O(n logn) vs 2 O(m n 2 log(m n)) ), and the emptiness problems for both are polynomial (O(n) vs O(m n 2 )).
We shall only give here a brief intuitive description of the mapping between GIL models (i.e. in nite traces) and S2S models (i.e. in nite binary trees) that is induced by our interpretation, again relegating the details of the proof to the appendix. The main idea is to set up a correspondence K : (2 P ) ! ! (2 P ) f0;1g between any GIL model and an S2S model. Once this is done, the mapping F : L GIL ! L S2S consists essentially of describing the constraints on the S2S model, so that for any M 2 (2 P ) ! ; f 2 L GIL , where P is the set of primitive propositions (predicate symbols), it is the case that M j = GIL f i K(M) j = S2S F(f) Figure 5 illustrates the mapping K. Let 
M (1) M (1) M ( These constraints are made deliberately more restrictive in order to simplify the mapping F. Note We can sharpen Lemma 5.1 to obtain an upper bound on the decision problem for GIL. The depth of an S2S-formula is the number of quanti er alternations in the formula written in prenex normal form. Recently, Klarlund 17] has established an essentially exponential upper bound on the complementation problem for in nite tree automata with a Rabin acceptance condition. This result, along with Rabin's celebrated proof of the decidability 27] of S2S, yields an upper bound of g(k; n 3 ) for deciding the satisability of an S2S sentence with quanti er alternation depth k, where g(k; n) is the iterated exponential function de ned by g(1; x) = c x and g(k; x) = 2 g(k?1;x) . Thus, if we bound the depth of GIL formul to be decided, we obtain the following upper bound for satis ability. Lemma 5.4 Bounded depth satis ability for GIL is in TIME(g(k; n 3 )).
Without bounding the depth, our upper bound result becomes weaker. Theorem 5.5 Upper Bound] Satis ability for GIL is in TIME(g(n; n 3 )). 
Non-Elementariness
We exhibit a non-elementary lower bound for GIL, by giving a polynomial time reduction from the non-emptiness problem for star-free extended regular expressions to the satis ability problem for GIL. Let represent the ( nite) alphabet for the extended star-free regular expressions. Then the language of extended star-free regular expressions is represented by L (:;+; ) , the parameters representing the operations in the language, namely complementation, union and concatenation.
Our reduction is via an encoding, from L (:;+; ) to GIL, which induces a mapping from extended starfree languages to sets of GIL models, which can be understood as follows. Given any word (necessarily nite) in an extended star-free language, fabricate a GIL structure M : ! ! 2 P( ) where P( ) = fP j 2 g]fP # g is the set of primitive propositions for GIL and # 6 2 is a special delimiter symbol introduced to facilitate the encoding. Between every two symbols in the word, insert a # and make the resulting word in nite by concatenating # ! on the right. Then simply replace every occurrence of in the string by the singleton set fP g, and take any model that is stuttering equivalent to this. The construction is illustrated in Figure 6 . In this way any extended star-free language L is mapped to a set of GIL models K(L) so that x 2 L i K(x) 2 K(L). The encoding E describes precisely this set of models, so that for any x 2 , hK(x); 0i j = E(L) i x 2 L. Lemma 5.6 Encoding] Let x be any extended star-free regular expression. There is a recursively de nable mapping E : L (+; ;:) ! L GIL satisfying the following properties : 13 jE ( That the mapping E satis es the rst two conditions of the lemma is immediate. For the third property one need only exhibit an e ective procedure for constructing a GIL model satisfying E(x) whenever L(x) is non-empty and, conversely, for constructing a string in L(x) given a GIL model satisfying E(x). For the former, we use the mapping procedure outlined earlier. For the latter, we use its \converse" | make the model stutter-free, then project out the # delimiter symbol introduced above. We omit the details. Using Lemma 5.6 and a slight tightening of Stockmeyer's result by F urer 12, p.32], we obtain 14 Theorem 5.8 Lower Bound] Satis ability for GIL is not in SPACE(g(n=(log n) 2 ; 1).
We have not been able to prove a bounded-depth lower bound for satis ability in GIL, because there appears to be no direct relation between the depth of nesting of : in an extended star-free regular expression and the depth of nesting of modalities in the corresponding GIL formula. 35] , by which it was largely inspired. There are, however, signi cant presentational and semantic di erences between our logic and that logic, which makes them di erent in expressiveness, decision procedures and complexity. The logics of 14] and 35] addressed the issue of context representation but su ered from the problem of computational complexity. In both cases the best available decision procedure is non-elementary 14 The reader should note that our lower bound is on DSPACE and our upper bound on DTIME. We can, of course, translate back and forth between these while adding or removing one level in the stack of 2's. 14, 26] ; see also 32]. Thus, automated veri cation using these logics is computationally intractable. FIL has an elementary decision procedure because it cannot succinctly express the chop operator of ITL; see related comments in Section 2.1. Clearly, there are properties that can be succinctly stated in ITL which do not have a succinct expression in FIL.
In 13], Goswami, Bell and Joseph introduce Interval Speci cation Logic (ISL), an interval based logic which, without its real-time constructs, is quite similar to FIL. One di erence is that the use, and construction, of interval modalities is quite restricted in ISL. However, the logic allows quanti cation over the number of occurrences of the \transition-event" associated with a formula. Combined with the interval constructors, this power of quanti cation makes the logic suitable for use in a re nement based reasoning methodology. While its precise expressive power vis-a-vis FIL is unclear, a proof theory for FIL would be quite similar to that for ISL, presented in 13].
Wolper, in his overview paper 42] on tableau-based satis ability procedures for temporal logics, states that \these methods do not seem to be applicable to interval logics." Although Plaisted 26 ] and Aaby and Narayana 1] give tableau-like decision procedures for 35], both methods use a translation into an intermediate language that has a non-elementary satis ability problem. Thus, their tableaux are not classical since the entries in the tableau are not formul of the logic, and their procedures, being indirect, provide fewer insights into the proof theory of the logic. Our decision procedure based on constructing a B uchi automaton, on the other hand, can be adapted in the usual manner to obtain a tableau-based algorithm for our logic 29, 31] .
In FIL, as in the logics of 14] and 35], intervals are derived from sequences of states and the transitions that form their end-points. An alternative approach, developed by Allen 3] , and by Halpern and Shoham 15], regards intervals as primitive. In this approach, primitive propositions hold for the interval. The logics provide modalities for relating intervals, assuming various forms of time. In this most general form, the logics are shown to be undecidable in 15], where the notions of locality and homogeneity are also introduced. Under the assumption of locality, a primitive proposition is true of an interval i it is true at its initial point. Homogeneity, on the other hand, means that a primitive proposition is true of an interval i it is true of every subinterval of that interval (including all the point intervals). While both these assumptions, to an extent, dilute the interval logics into point-based logics, it turns out that some fragments become decidable under these simpli cations. However, even in the decidable cases, the decision algorithm is provably non-elementary. The Halpern-Shoham interval logics have been further developed, and their proof theory investigated, by Venema in a series of papers; see 41], for related references.
Conclusion
We have presented an interval logic, FIL, equivalent in expressiveness to PTL without`next'. FIL allows the expression of properties de ned over intervals in a manner that appears to be more natural and intuitive than the deeply nested formulas required in PTL. FIL also has a graphical representation that may be easier for ordinary programmers and system designers to use than the textual representation of PTL.
We have given a doubly exponential deterministic time decision procedure for FIL which, as far as we are aware, is the rst decision procedure of elementary complexity for an interval logic. As a byproduct of our decidability proof we obtain the subformula property for FIL, implying the existence of a cut-free proof system for the logic. Kutty et al 18] provides a complete Hilbert-style axiomatization for FIL. A proof system in the natural deduction style would be helpful for carrying out complex proofs in the logic, and we believe that one can be derived along the lines of the decision procedure presented in this paper.
We have also examined a generalization of FIL that allows search operators that search backwards into the past, in addition to the forward search operators of FIL, and have shown that this generalization renders the decision problem non-elementary.
A further extension of the logic involves the introduction of a notion of real-time and durations into the logic. This is the subject of a companion paper 31].
We have developed a set of tools for the logic that include a tableau-based decision procedure derived from the automata-based procedure that we have described in this paper. These tools are written in Common Lisp and are available by anonymous ftp from alpha.ece.ucsb.edu in the directory /pub/GIL. this point it checks that (i) is accepting (no unsatis ed eventualities), and stores (i) on its tape. (M now has to keep three states and one counter on its tape.)
From this point on, for every new guess it decrements ctr p until ctr p is 0. At this point it checks that (i) and (i + p) are the same and halts. This completes the proof of PSPACE-containment.
To prove PSPACE-hardness, we rst introduce some notation.
Notation. Consider a one-tape deterministic Turing machine M, with states Q, alphabet , initial state q 0 2 Q, accepting states Q a Q, and transition function :Q ! Q f+1; ?1g. We shall use (q; )(i), 1 i 3 to represent, respectively, the new state, symbol written and head movement of M. A run of M is a sequence 1 2 . . . k ; such that for all i < k, i+1 is the next con guration of i , and 1 is an initial con guration. An accepting run is a run, the last con guration of which is an accepting con guration; otherwise it is a rejecting run.
The language accepted by M is the set L(M) = f x 2 j there is an accepting run C with C(1) = q 0 x g. A run C of M accepts x 2 i C is an accepting run with tape(C(1)) = x. A run C uses space at most s if for every C(i), jtape(C(i))j s. A deterministic Turing machine operates in space S(n) provided that, for every x 2 L(M), if jxj = n then the run C of M on x uses space at most S(n).
Lemma 3 Bounded depth satis ability is PSPACE-hard. Proof. We encode the Turing Machine recognition of a PSPACE language L by a polynomially computable mapping f that maps every string x in into f(x), a suitably compact FIL formula, such that f(x) is satis able i x 2 L. (In the following S(n) is a space constructible function of n.) We now give the encoding. Lemma 4 For any S(n) n, L and L 2 DSPACE(S(n)) there exists a mapping f from to FIL formul such that x 2 L i f(x) is satis able if jxj = n then size(f(x)) = O(S(n)) f is computable in time polynomial in S.
Proof. Let M be a deterministic Turing machine that accepts L and operates in space S(n). We assume without loss of generality that M halts when it accepts or rejects. We also assume that M never repeats con gurations, for if it did then, being deterministic, it would not halt.
Let x be such that jxj = n, and let m = S(n). Since M operates in S(n), we need only concern ourselves with the contents of the rst m cells of the tape. In what follows we use the following generic subscripts with corresponding default ranges: i ranges over tape-squares 1 i m q; q 0 range over TM states Q ; 0 range over the TM alphabet We de ne the following primitive propositions: C i; , so that j = C i; i (tape( ))(i) = H i , so that j = H i i pos( ) = i F q ; so that j = F q i state( ) = q
We now code an accepting run of M on x by the following:
The nite control is in a unique state: We code an accepting con guration as follows:
We code the initial con guration with input x = 0 n as follows: We may now easily prove that the mapping f satis es the three properties required in the statement of the lemma. The set srch(P) here includes backwards searches also, as de ned by the syntax de nition in Section 5.1.
is de ned for a given A 2 2 f0;1g and x; y 2 f0; 1g by induction on the structure of 2 srch(P) ? f!; g as follows:
locate(A; To prove that F preserves satis ability, one need merely go back to our model mapping K to see how to construct for a given GIL model M for f, the S2S model K(M) for F(f), and vic e-versa . A formal proof of the correctness of the construction uses induction on the structure of f and requires as sublemmas the correctness of the S2S de nable relations used in the mapping. We leave these details to the reader.
Proof of Lemma 5.3. The proof is immediate from Lemma 5.1. It is easy to verify that the rst property is satis ed, by noting that each interval construction (interval modality) introduces a quanti er alternation. The formal proof uses induction on the structure of the GIL formula f.
